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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9807

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2888

USNMR SHAPE

USDOCSOUTH

USCINCEUR

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION BERLIN

USDEL SALT TWO

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 1957

DISTO

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: APRIL 18 NAC DISCUSSION OF SOVIET PROPOSED RULES OF
PROCEDURE

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

SUMMARY: COUNCIL WAS UNANIMOUS IN PRAISING DILIGENCE, PATIENCE
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AND SKILL DEMONSTRATED BY QUARLES AND DEAN AS NATO SPOKESMEN IN
QUADRILATERAL TALKS, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THESE

NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED.

WITH EXCEPTION OF UK, ALL COUNTRIES (TURKS RELUCTANTLY) WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT SOVIET PROPOSAL IN TOTO AS A REASON-ABLE, BEST- AVAILABLE COMPROMISE WHICH IN EFFECT LEFT HUNGARY IN ABEYANCE AND PROTECTED ESSENTIALS OF THE ALLIED POSITION. BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPS MADE KEY CONTRIBUTION BY AGREEING THAT PRESENT TEXT CONSTITUTED SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF HUNGARIAN PROBLEM FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. A NUMBER OF PERMREPS, URGED THAT THE UNILATERAL STATEMENTS BE INCORPORATED IN THE TEXT ITSELF AND THAT PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THE PROCEDURES DOCUMENT BE SUCH AS TO MINIMIZE ANY APPEARANCE OF ALLIED EFEAT ON THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION. UK REP ON " EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS" GAVE BRITISH POSITION ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY ADVANCED IN VIENNA, WARNING THAT PAPER WOULD EFFECTIVELY RULE OUT HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION IN ANY AGREE-MENTS. HE SUGGESTED DELETION OF PARA 3 OF PAPER AND EFERRAL OF PARTICIPATION ISSUE TO NEGOTIATING PHASE WHILE USING INITIAL TALKS FOR QUICK AGREEMENT ON EASIER POINTS, I. E. VENUE AND DATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS PLUS SIMPLIFIED AGENDA LIST. SUGGESTION FOR DELETION PARA 3 DREW NO SUPPORT. WHEN PRESSED BY U. S. AND SYG FOR EARLY MEETING, UK REP SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE BEFORE APRIL 24, BUT AGREED TO NOTIFY SYG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER UK COULD AGREE TO PRESENT TEXT OR FELT ANOTHER MEETING REQUIRED. SYG INDICATED IS IN THE INTERIM WOULD DRAFT AND CIRCULATE GUIDANCE FOR AHG ALONG LINES PARA 23 OF TEXT ON ASSUMPTION BRITISH CAN APPROVE. END SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL WELCOMED AHG CHAIRMAN, ALLIED EMISSARIES (DEAN AND QUARLES) AND OTHER AD HOC GROUP REPS PRESENT FOR THE COUNCIL MEETING (INCLUDING UK CHARGE THOMPSON). HE SUMMARIZED SALIENT POINTS OF DEAN/ QUARLES REPORT AND AHG EVALUATION (VIENNA 3036 AND 3090). HE OBSERVED THAT RECOMMENDATION IN DEAN/ QUARLES REPORT HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY GREAT MAJORITY OF PERMREPS AT APRIL 7 LUNCHEON BUT THAT UK REP UNDER INSTRUCTIONS HAD POINTED OUT NUMBER OF DISADVANTAGES. WHILE COUNCIL SHOULD EVALUATE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SOVIET PROPOSAL, MOST ALLIES HAD ALREADY WEIGHED THESE CONSIDERATIONS AND FOUND BALANCE IN FAVOR OF SOVIET PROPOSAL. IN FACE OF THIS VIEW HELD BY " VAST MAJORITY," PRECEDENT HELD THAT HE AS SYG SHOULD ASK DISSENTING NUMBER TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS TO WITHDRAW OBJECTIONS.

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2. SYG STRESSED SENSITIVITY OF NAC DISCUSSION. AS AHG HAD WISELY DECIDED, PRESS WOULD BE TOLD NO MORE THAN THAT NAC WAS TAKING STOCK OF SITUATION IN VIENNA. SYG THEN CALLED ON DANISH WEEKLY AHG CHAIRMAN (POULSEN), QUARLES AND DEAN IN THAT ORDER FOR INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

3. POULSEN GAVE STATEMENT ALONG LINES OF VIENNA 3148 NOTAL, ADDING THAT AHG HAD HAD OPPORTUNITY AFTER EACH SESSION WITH SOVIETS TO EVALUATE RESULTS AND MAKE NEW SUGGESTIONS TO

ALLIED EMISSARIES SO THAT OUTCOME SHOULD BE REAGRDED AS PRODUCT OF
ENTIRE AD HOC GROUP.

4. QUARLES SAID THAT COUNCIL HAD INSTRUCTED AHG TO PROBE SOVIETS
ON A FORMULA TO PLACE HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION QUESTION IN ABEYANCE.
OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN TO PROVIDE JURIDICAL BASIS FOR RAISING THIS
QUESTION IN NEGOTIATIONS. NOTWITHSTANDING FLANK STATUS ACCORDED
HUNGARY IN SOVIET PROPOSAL, THIS OBJECTIVE HAD NOW BEEN ACHIEVED.
ALL ASPECTS OF POTENTIAL HUNGARIAN INVOLVEMENT COULD BE RAISED,
ON UNDERSTANDING THAT EXCHANGE OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS WOULD BE
INCORPORATED IN AGREED PROCEDURES PAPER OR HAVE EQUAL STATUS WITH
IT. SOVIET PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A STEP BEYOND NAC GUIDANCE, AND
DID NOT PRECLUDE ALLIED REPS FROM SEEKING IN ADDITION AN AGENDA
ITEM TO COVER NON- CIRCUMVENTION IN HUNGARY.

5. IF THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE DEAN/ QUARLES REPORT WERE ACCEPTED,
THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE WOULD BE RESOLVED. QUARLES RECALLED POINTS
IN PARAS 19-21 OF REPORT, STRESSING HUNGARIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
ITS OWN PARTICIPATION AND PROTECTION AGAINST COOPTION OF FLANKS.
WHILE PACT COULD AGAIN BRING UP INCLUSION OF ITALY AS A TRADE- OFF
FOR HUNGARY, IT WOULD HAVE NO JURIDICAL BASIS FOR DOING SO.
ALLIES COULD CONTINUE TO RECALL THAT STATUS OF NATO FLANK COUNTRIES
HAD BEEN PROPOSED AND ACCEPTED IN EXCHANGE OF NOTES BEFORE BEGINNING
OF TALKS.

6. WITH REFERENCE TO MISGIVINGS OF SOME (I. E., UK) ON COMMITMENT
OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS " POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE
AGREEMENTS," QUARLES SAID IT WAS CLEAR TO ALL THAT THERE WAS NO
ADVANCE OBLIGATION INVOLVED. SOVIETS MIGHT LIKE TO READ SUCH AN
OBLIGATION INTO THEIR LANGUAGE, BUT RUSSIAN TRANSLATION
OF " POTENTIAL" WAS IDENTICAL TO ENGLISH AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT ANY
AGREEMENTS WOULD BE VOLUNT

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7. QUARLES CONCLUDED THAT ONLY FURTHER CHANGES THAT SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT IN THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD BE MINOR TEXTUAL ADJUSTMENTS. IF ALLIES PURSUED SUGSTANTIVE CHANGES, SOVIETS MIGHT WELL WITHDRAW THEIR PROPOSAL AND INSIST ON CHANGES IN THE ALLIED STATEMENT ON HUNGARY. TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS, HE DREW AT LENGTH ON KVITSINSKY'S REMARKS IN FINAL QUADRAIPARTITE MEETING IN PARA 15 VIENNA 2890. HE ATTRIBUTED FAVORABLE RESULT OF ALLIED PROBLE TO PERSISTENCE IN TAKING FIRM LINE WITH SOVIETS OVER PAST MONTH.

8. PICKING UP QUARLES' LAST POINT, DEAN NOTED THAT ALLIED EMIS-
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SARIES HAD EXHAUSTIVELY EXAMINED A VARIETY OF FORMULATIONS TO SAME EFFECT, (I. E., PLACING HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION IN ABEYANCE) IN 20 SESSIONS WITH PACT REPS SINCE MARCH 12. RESULTS, WHICH MIGHT BE CALLED GETTING BLOOD OUT OF A STONE, WERE INDEED THE RPRODUCT OF ALLIED PERSISTENCE. SOVIET POSITION ON EXCLUSION OF HUNGARY FROM DIRECT PARTICIPATION PREDATED TALKS AND WAS DEFINITIVE. SOVIETS HAD CHARACTERIZED APRIL 7 PROPOSAL, AS CONFIRMED ON APRIL 13, AS THEIR " LAST PROPOSAL." FACT THAT THEY SEE IT AS IMPORTANT CONCESSION IS SHOWN BY APPARENT REQUIREMENT FOR POLITBURO T O APPROVE IT. DEAN SAID HE PERSONALLY COULD ENVISION NO OTHER POSSIBLE OUTCOME.

9. DEAN RECALLED THT MANY ALLIES HAD ONCE HELD STRONG DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN TALKS WAS OF SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE. IMPORTANCE OF HUNGARY SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER EXAGGERATED NOW, WHEN A WAY HAD BEEN FOUND TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.. HE DID NOT SHARE VIEW THAT ACCEPANCE OF PROPOSAL WOULD LEAD SOVIETS TO EXPECT QUICK CONCESSIONS FROM ALLIES IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIETS HAD FOUND ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MUCH TOUGHER ON HUNGARIAN ISSUE THAN THE
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EXPECTED. THERE IS SIFFICENT CONTENT NOW IN SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SUBSTANTIATE TO WESTERN PUBLICS THAT ALLIES ARE NOT ALONE IN HAVING MADE CONCESSIONS.

DEAN CONCLUDED THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME RISK TO MBFR ENTERPRISE IF THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER DELAYS AS THE RESULT OF ALLIED REJECTION OF SOVIET PROPOSAL.

10. SYG ASKED THOMSON TO EXPLAIN UK POSITION. THOMSON COMPARED HIS POSITION TO PRISONER IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY, BOTH IN VIENNA AND BRUSSELS (TO WHICH SYG REPLIED THAT BEING IN JEOPARDY IN LONDON WOULD BE MORE SERIOUS). UNDER " HIGH- LEVEL" INSTRUCTIONS, THOMSON SAID THAT UK HAD NOT TAKEN A DEFINITIVE POSITION ON DEAN/ QUARLES RECOMMENDATION, BUT WISHED TO LISTEN TO VIEWS OF ALLIES.

11. THOMSON CONTINUED, HOWEVER, THAT UK WAS CONCERNED ABOUT STARTING NEGOTIATIONS IN A BAD LIGHT. WHATEVER THE SUBSTANTIVE PROS AND CONS OF INCLUDING HUNGARY AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT AND IN SUBSEQUENT MBFR AGEEMENTS, ALLIED CONCESSIONS MIGHT HAVE POLITICAL
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SIDE EFFECTS IN BALKANS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. SOVIETS HAD RESERVED ON A NUMBER OF POINTS IN DISCUSSION WITH ALLIES, AND HAD GIVEN UP NOTHING IN A DEFINITIVE WAY. CONCESSIONS BY ALLIES NOW WOULD ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO RAISE FRESH OBSTACLES. ALLIES ALREADY KNEW THAT SIVIETS WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THRUST OF SOVIET TACTICS WAS TO SPIN OUT MBFR INITIAL TALKS UNTIL HELSINKI MPT FINISHED.

12. UK HAD ACCEPTED MARCH 12 NAC DECISION " RELUCTANTLY BUT LOYALLY." THERE WERE TWO ESSENTIAL POINTS IN THIS DECISION: RULES OF PROCEDURE WOULD SPECIFY 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND ONLY 7 SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS; HUNGARY WOULD BE MENTIONED IN THE SAME PARA AS THE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

13. SOVIET PROPOSAL, THOMSON CONTINUED, DID NOT ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES. ALLIED EMISSARIES DESER ED FULL CREDIT, BUT SOVIET PROPOSAL CONTAINED FOLLOWING SHORTCOMINGS:

A) ALLIED VIEWS ON HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION APPEARED ONLY IN EXCHANGE OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS. THESE STATEMENTS WERE NOT LIKELY TO BE IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND MIGHT NOT EVEN BE IN ACTUAL TEXT OF AGREED RULES OF PROCEDURE.

B) LINK BETWEEN PARTICIPATION OF HUNGARY AND ITALY WAS IMPLICITLY MAINTAINED IN EXCHANGE OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS.

C) " POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS" WOULD HAVE MORAL OBLIGATION TO BECOME PARTIES TO MBFR AGREEMENTS.

D) ENLARGEMENT FORMULA WAS GENERAL, AND MADE NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO HUNGARY.

14. THOMSON RECALLED LAST TWO PARAS OF MARCH 12 NAC GUIDANCE (USNATO 1242). RE PARA C OF THE GUIDANCE, HE QUESTIONED WHETHER

SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT ALLIES TO SEEK AN AGENDA ITEM PROVIDING FOR NON- CIRCUMVENTION IN HUNGARY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QUARLES HAD GIVEN VIEW THAT THEY COULD AND WOULD. NEVERTHELESS, HE COULD NOT HELP WONDERING IF ALLIES STILL FELT AS STRONGLY ABOUT THIS POINT AS THEY HAD IN MARCH WHEN THEY HAD AGREED ON PARA C.

15. THOMSON STRESSED THAT MOST SERIOUS UK RESERVATION WAS LISTING OF HUNGARY AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT, A FAIT ACCOMPLI WHICH
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UNILATERAL EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS WOULD NOT EFFECTIVELY MODIFY. THUS, UK COULD HAVE ACCEPTED SOVIET PROPOSAL IF PARA 3 HAD BEEN OMITTED, OR IF HUNGARY HAD BEEN OMITTED FROM LIST OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS.

16. THOMSON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLIED EMISSARIES THOUGHT SOVIET PACKAGE WOULD BE HARD TO CHANGE, AND ASKED IF OTHER ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEEK FURTHER AMENDMENTS.

17. AS AN LATERNATIVE TO AMENDING PACKAGE, HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO RAISE AGAIN THE EARLIER UK PROPOSAL TO MEET ON AN " ALL-19" BASIS, AND TO POSTPONE RESOLUTION OF PARTICIPATION QUESTION UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS OR TACKLE IT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IF SUCH A PROCEDURE WERE ADOPTED, ALLIES WOULD THEN SEEK EARLY CONCLUSION OF EXPLORATIONS WITH AGREED COMMUNIQUE SPECIFYING THE DATE AND PLACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND A SIMPLE AGENDA. ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ACCEPT VIENNA VENUE AND A DATE LATER RATHER THAN EARLIER IN SEPTEMBER- OCTOBER PERIOD. AGENDA DESCRIPTION MIGHT BE NO MORE THAN AN EXPANDED TITLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ON AGENDA QUESTION, SOVIETS ARE NOW IN STRONGER POSITION, SINCE THEY APPEAR TO WANT A SIMPLER AGENDA THAN ALLIES PROPOSE TO SEEK ON BASIS OF GUIDELINES AND AGENDA PAPER, BUT ALLIES MIGHT NOW DECIDE TO SETTLE FOR SOMETHING EVERY SIMPLE, SETTING ASIDE AGENDA ISSUES FOR LATER.

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18. SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS) EXPRESSED FULL UNDERSTANDING FOR WORK OF DEAN AND QUARLES AND INCAPABILITY TO COMPREHEND UK POSITION. REAL ISSUE INVOLVED IN HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION WAS SECURITY, AND ALLIES HAD ACHIEVED RIGHT TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ALLIED FLANKS. IT WAS TRUE THAT HUNGARY WOULD NOT BE A DIRECT PARTICIPANT FOR NOW, BUT IT WOULD BE A " VERY SPECIAL" PARTICIPANT -- THE ONLY ONE IN THAT STATUS. THERE WAS NO REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS SOLUTION AND PLACING HUNGARY IN ABEYANCE. HE THOUGHT UK AND NETHERLANDS HAD A MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT ALLIED OBJECTIVES. QUARLES HAD GIVEN
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ASSURANCE THAT ALLIES COULD GET NON- CIRCUMVENTION IN HUNGARY ON THE AGENDA IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. NETHERLANDS HAD NEVER HOPED TO SOLVE ISSUE IN EXPLORATIONS, BUT RATHER TO AVOID LOSING RIGHT TO BRING IT UP IN NEGOTIATIONS. THAT AIM HAD NOW BEEN ACHIEVED.
19. WITH REGARD TO UK RESERVATION ABOUT PHRASE " POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS," IT APPEARED TO HIM THAT UK WAS NOW QUESTIONING WHETHER IT WAS OBLIGED TO TAKE PART IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH.

20. TURNIG TO ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION PROPOSED BY THOMSON, SPIERENBURG FOUND THAT ALLIES WOULD THEREBY ACHIEVE LESS THAN CURRENT SOVIET PROPOSAL. SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE " NICER" IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULT MIGHT BE IN FACT BE WORSE. MOREOVER, SPIERENBURG WAS PUZZLED BY UK VIEWS ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HELSINKI AND VIENNA. WOULD SOVIETS BE LIKELY TO ACCEPT A DATE FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE CSCE ISSUES RESOLVED IN HELSINKI? DE STAERCKE (BELGIAM) SAID GOB PREPARED TO ACCEPT DEAN/ QUARLES RECOMMENDATION. HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH DEAN THAT THERE WAS ANY QUESTION ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE

OF MEASURES INVOLVING HUNGARY IN NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SOVIETS HAD NOT WON THIS POINT. WHATEVER STATUS WAS AGREED FOR EXCHANGE OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS, THEY WOULD BE ON RECORD AND COULD BE CITED BY ALLIES. SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS NEITHER A DEFEAT NOR A VICTORY FOR ALLIES, BUT A GOOD STARTING POINT.

21. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL BY THOMSON COULD BE A COMPLEMENT RATHER THAN A SUBSTITUTE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSAL. DE STAERCKE THOUGHT ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER NEXT STEPS ALONG LINES OF UK THINKING, AND ASKED VIEWS OF OTHERS ON HOW AGENDA, COMMUNIQUE AND PLENARY MEETINGS IN VIENNA MIGHT BE HANDLED. HOWEVER, HE OPPOSED ANY ATTEMPT TO MODIFY SOVIET PROPOSAL. IN PARTICULAR, ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS PARA 3 MIGHT JEOPARDIZE EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS. IN THAT CASE ALLIES WOULD REALLY BE DEFEATED.

22. ERALP (TURKEY) TOOK CAUTIOUS LINE ON DEAN/ QUARLES EVALUATION, WHICH TURKISH AUTHORITIES FOUND TOO OPTIMISTIC. ENLARGEMENT FORMULA IN TURKISH VIEW IS OF LIMITED USEFULNESS FOR HUNGARY, AND AT SAME TIME FAILS TO PRECLUDE ATTEMPTS TO BRING IN ALLIED FLANKS. HE PROPOSED RENEWED ATTEMPT TO INSERT LIMITATIONS ON ENLARGEMENT TO STATES WITH FORCES OR TERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE OR SOME SIMILAR FORMULATION IN PARA 2 OF SOVIET PROPOSAL.

23. ERALP SAID TURKISH VIEW WAS THAT SOVIETS WERE NOT MAKING ANY SECRET

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REAL CONCESSIONS, AND DID NOT FEEL NEED TO DO SO, BEARING IN MIND PRESSURE ON US AND OTHER ALLIES TO LIMIT DEFENSE SPENDING. HOWEVER, TURKEY WOULD NOT GO AGAINST MAJORITY VIEW OF ALLIES IF IT WERE DECIDED TO GIVE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL, AS LONG AS ALLIES CONTINUE TO AGREE ON NEED TO PRESERVE ESSENTIAL FLANK INTERESTS. HE COULD NOT CONCUR IN UK IDEA OF SUPPRESSION PARA 3 OF SOVIET PROPOSAL, AND WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT VALUE OF ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED BY THOMSON. KRAPF SAID FRG COULD ACCEPT SOVIET PROPOSAL ON FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

A) HUNGARY ALONE WAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS;

B) THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE FORMAL STATUS OF EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS;

C) IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT PROBLEM OF FORCE LEVELS IN HUNGARY WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN NEGOTIATIONS. FRG WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO SUPPRESS PARA 3 OF SOVIET PROPOSAL, BUT NOT INSIST ON THIS. KRAPF SAID FRG ALSO WISHED TO PURSUE FOLLOWING IN FURTHER EXCHANGES ABOUT SOVIET PROPOSAL:

A) THERE SHOULD BE WRITTEN RECORD OF EXCHANGE OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS;

B) UNDERSTANDING THAT STATEMENTS MIGHT BE USED PUBLICLY;

C) ATTEMPT TO GET SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CARRY OVER RULES OF PROCEDURE INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

24. KRAPF PROPOSED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS:

A) WHAT WAS STATUS OF SOVIET PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL, AND WAS IT STILL IN ANY WAY NEGOTIABLE?

B) DID IT PROVIDE SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR DISCUSSION OF FORCE LEVELS IN HUNGARY IN NEGOTIATIONS?

C) DID ALLIES AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD PRESS TO GET SPECIFIC CONSTRAINTS IN HUNGARY?

25. KRAPF ADDED THAT QUESTION OF TRANSLATION OF SOVIET PROPOSAL
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IS STILL TO BE DISCUSSED. VERSION IN LANGUAGES OTHER THAN ENGLISH SHOULD BE LIST PARTICIPANTS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER, BUT STATED THAT SEATING IS TO BE DETERMINED BY ORDER GIVEN IN ENGLISH VERSION. ALTERNATIVELY, PARTICIPANTS COULD BE LISTED IN SAME ORDER AS IN ENGLISH, WITH A NOTE THAT THEY ARE LISTED THIS WAY BECAUSE THEY SO APPEAR IN THE ENGLISH VERSION.

26. LUNS THOUGHT THAT ALLIED EMISSARIES HAD ALREADY ANSWERED KRAPF' S QUESTION ABOUT NEGOTIABILITY OF SOVIET PROPOSAL. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT PIECES OF PROPOSAL COULD NOT BE SEPARATED.

27. RESPONDING TO KRAPF' S QUESTIONS, QUARLES ANSWERED THAT ALL ASPECTS OF HUNGARIAN INVOLVEMENT INCLUDING FORCE LEVELS AND CONSTRAINTS COULD BE RAISED AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO MAINTAIN THE ORDER IN THE PRESENT PROPOSAL BUT THAT FURTHER EFFORTS COULD BE TAKEN BY THE WEST IN VIENNA TO CLARIFY THIS POINT.

28. DEAN, RESPONDING TO EARLIER QUESTIONS, CHARACTERIZED STATUS OF SOVIET PROPOSAL AS AN OFFER THAT SOVIETS WOULD DOUBTLESS STAND TO; THE PROPOSAL WAS A PACKAGE; UNDER TERMS OF EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS, FORCE LEVELS AND CONSTRAINTS IN HUNGARY COULD BE RAISED; THAT DROPPING PARA 3 OF THE PROPOSAL HAD NOT BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE AHG AND IF TRIED WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN LOSING THE COMPLEMENTARY STATEMENTS; THAT THE UK IDEA OF CARRYING THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE OVER TO NEGOTIATION WAS INTRINSICALLY BAD FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(A) IT WOULD REPEAT AT OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS PROBLEM ON WHICH 2 1/2 MONTHS HAD TO BE SPENT; (B) FUTURE RESULTS MAY NOT BE AS GOOD AS THE PRESENT PROPOSAL; (C) IT COULD REOPEN STATUS OF FLANKS AND PARTICIPATION OF OTHERS SUCH AS NEUTRALS, AND (D) THE SOVIETS HAVE FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO SOLVE THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE IN THE

PRESENT TALKS AND TO SOLVE IT BEFORE
MOVING TO AGENDA, DATE, OR PLACE AND WOULD NOT AGREE TO UK LINE.
HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THE
SOVIETS WOULD HONOR AGREEMENT REACHED AND SAW NEXT STEPS AS
BEING PLENARY DISCUSSIONS OF AGENDA AND REMAINING ISSUES. HE
NOTED THE SOVIETS HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN CONCLUDING EXPLOR-
ATIONS AND MOVING TO NEGOTIATIONS.

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29. CATALANO (ITALY) REVIEWED ADVANTAGES OF PRESENT PROPOSAL,
OPPOSED UK AMENDMENTS AND URGED THAT CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY
AHG BE APPROVED BY NAC.

30. HJORTH- NIELSEN (DENMARK) WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT PROPOSAL
AND POINTED OUT POSSIBLE UNFORTUNATE INFLUENCES ON MPT IF
PROPOSAL WERE NOT ACCEPTED.

31. CHORAFAS (GREECE) SHARED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE HEASITATION OF THE UK, WHILE OPPOSING THE UK' S AMENDMENTS. HE QUESTIONED
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OVERALL DESIRABILITY TO ALLIANCE OF MBFR BUT WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT PRESENT PROPOSAL WITHOUT " TOO MUCH ENTHUSIASM."

32. DRAWING ON STATE 071357, RUMSFELD (U. S.) INDICATED HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT TEXT. HE SUPPORTED DANISH AND DUTCH VIEW THAT IMPORTANT POINT IN HUNGARIAN QUESTION WAS SECURITY NOT PARTICIPATION AS SUCH, AND AGREED WITH OTHER REPS THAT DELETION OF PARA 3 WOULD JEOPARDIZE SOVIET AGREEMENT EMBODIED IN THE UNILATERAL STATEMENTS AND HAVE DIVISIVE EFFECT WITHIN ALLIANCE. HE SUPPORTED UK PREFERENCE FOR WINDING UP INITIAL TALKS QUICKLY, BUT THOUGHT THOMSON PROCEDURAL SUGGESTION WOULD IN FACT ONLY DELAY MATTERS. HE CONTESTED THOMSON' S VIEW THAT ACCEPTANCE OF TEXT WOULD BE MAJOR SETBACK FOR ALLIANCE, NOTING THAT NATURE OF THE COMPROMISE INVOLVED COULD NOT ON BALANCE BE SO DESCRIBED. HE ALSO CONTESTED UK VIEW THAT COMPROMISE DEPARTED FROM NAC AGREEMENT AND GUIDANCE ON NON- CIRCUMVENTION, NOTING THAT NAC POSITION STILL STOOD AND THAT NO ONE HAD QUESTIONED OR DEPARTED FROM IT. HE ADDED THAT ONE ADVANTAGE OF TEXT NOT PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED WAS THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AND THAT DOCUMENT WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SOVIETS TO ARGUE THAT STATIONED FORCES IN AREAS BEYOND TERRITORY OF THOSE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE COVERED. RUMSFELD ALSO NOTED ADDITIONAL PUBLIC FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED, NAMELY THAT THE TALKS HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED SOME NEGATIVE PRESS IN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES, IN LARGE MEASURE BECAUSE PLENARY MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD UP FOR SO LONG. FURTHER DELAYS WOULD BE LIKELY TO MEAN INCREASED PRESS SNIPING, WHICH CAN ONLY UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF ALLIED NEGOTIATORS. HE URGED THAT NAC TAKE REQUISITE ACTION TO ENABLE AD HOC GROUP TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA NEXT WEEK.

33. KRISTVIK (NORWAY) SHARED SOME OF THE PREOCCUPATIONS EARLIER EXPRESSED BY OTHERS BUT WAS PREPARED TO APPROVE AHG RECOMMENDATIONS.

34. KRAPF ASKED ALLIED EMISSARIES TO SEEK SOVIET CONFIRMATION ON SEATING ARRANGEMENTS AND STRONGLY ADVOCATED THAT UK PROCEDURAL APPROACH BE KEPT IN MIND IF THE CURRENT PROPOSAL IS NOT SUCCESSFUL.
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35. MENZIES (CANADA) THANKED THE UK FOR BEING THE DEVIL' S ADVOCATE, SUPPORTED THE PRESENT PROPOSAL, HOPED IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE FOR THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND URGED THAT ALLIED EMISSARIES CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN FLEXIBILITY. HE SUPPORTED U. S. POINT ON PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD INITIAL TALKS.

36. THOMSON RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS WHICH HAD ARISEN IN DISCUSSION; HE BELIEVED THE TURKISH ASSESSMENT WAS MORE REALISTIC THAN THE EMISSARIES'; HIS AUTHORITIES CONTEND THAT THE PRESENT PROPOSAL GIVES THE SOVIETS A VETO OVER RAISING HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION; THE UK SEES THE PROSPECTS FOR OBTAINING A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE CONCERNING HUNGARY AS WORSENING; RE LINKAGE WITH CSCE HE BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WOULD SPIN OUT DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA UNTIL THE END OF MPT WAS ASSURED; HE QUESTIONED THE NEED TO NAIL DOWN THE SOVIETS TO A SPECIFIC DATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, CLAIMING THAT PAPER GIVEN TO MR. KISSINGER IN MOSCOW WAS AN AGREEMENT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SEPT/ OCT 1973 TIME FRAME.

37. QUARLES, RESPONDING TO ERALP' S QUESTIONS, ARGUED THAT THE ENLARGEMENT FORMULA DID NOT REPEAT NOT PUT FLANK COUNTRIES IN ABEYANCE AND THAT EMISSARIES' EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO INSERT PHRASE " WITH FORCES OR GERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE" HAD BEEN EXPLICITLY REJECTED BY THE SOVIETS. HE THOUGHT SOVIETS WOULD ALSO REJECT WORDS " IN THE AREA."

38. SYG, IN SUMMING UP, NOTED VERY STRONG MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF PARA 23 OF EMISSARIES' REPORT; NOTED CONFIRMATION OF ANNEX OF NAC POSITION OF MARCH 12; NOTED THAT THERE WAS NEITHER BROAD NOR WARM SUPPORT FOR UK PROPOSAL, AND SUGGESTED THAT NAC ACCEPT PROPOSAL SUBJECT TO UK CONFIRMATION OR NEGATION BY EVENING OF APRIL 24.

39. SYG INDICATED HE WOULD ASK INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO CIRCULATE APPROVAL A DRAFT OF THE NAC GUIDANCE TO THE AHG, FOR USE WHEN NAC APPROVED SOVIET PROPOSAL. DRAFT GUIDANCE WOULD CONTAIN A PARAPHRASE OF PARA 23 OF EMISSARIES' REPORT AND PARAS 1 AND 2 OF NAC DECISION OF MARCH 12. WE WILL CABLE TEXT WHEN RECEIVED.

40. THOMSON THOUGHT HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD PREFER FURTHER CON-
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SULTATIONS. RUMSFELD SUGGESTED NAC MEETING BE HELD APRIL 19. THOMSON DID NOT THINK HE COULD OBTAIN ANY NEW INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO THE WEEKEND. ON THE BASIS OF A SUGGESTION BY SPIERENBURG, SYG ASKED THOMSON TO INFORM HIM WHEN NEW INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED SO SYG COULD DETERMINE WHETHER A FURTHER NAC MEETING WAS NECESSARY. IF UK COULD APPROVE PROPOSAL, A MEETING WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. THOMSON AGREED TO DO SO
BY APRIL 24-25.

RUMSFELD

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